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ADMINISTERING THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
LAW, POLITICS, AND TAXONOMY
Nicholas J. Johnson*

INTRODUCTION

Predicting the trajectory of the right to keep and bear
arms is difficult. The task will become even harder if, as I
expect, the United States Supreme Court applies the Second
Amendment to the states in McDonald v. Chicago.' This
article anticipates the post-McDonald landscape by assessing
the right to arms in the context of several state regulations
and the arguments that might be employed as challenges to
them unfold.
So far, the core test for determining the scope of the
individual right to arms is the common use standard
articulated in District of Columbia v. Heller.2 Measured
against that, standard firearm regulations fit into three
categories. The first category contains laws that are easily
3
administered under the common use standard.
The second category-and the primary focus of this
article-consists of laws that can be approached but not fully
resolved under the common use standard.4 These laws pose
challenges of taxonomy5 that invite embellishment and
manipulation of the common use standard.
Some regulations fit into a third category that is entirely
*Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, J.D. Harvard Law
School, 1984. Thanks to Gene Hoffman for his comments and Tameem
Zainulbhai for his research and editing.
1. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 1317 (2010).
2. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 (2008) (holding that
firearms in common use for lawful self-defense are constitutionally protected).

3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part II.
5. I use the term "taxonomy" loosely to incorporate both substantive and
political variables.
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outside the range of the common use standard but still
burdens firearms ownership in a way that demands
attention.6 Challenges to these regulations will require some
species of interest balancing, levels of scrutiny analysis, or, as
I will suggest, analogies to doctrines like regulatory takings.
It is difficult to predict precisely how the decisions will
develop here. My aim for this category is to describe the
spectrum of regulations that fit within it and to highlight one
of the most difficult problems in the category-regulation of
guns outside the home.
I. THE EASY FITS

Heller's common use standard gives straightforward
answers to a number of questions. It tells us explicitly that
handguns
commonly
owned
for
self-defense
are
7
constitutionally protected. It suggests that other commonly
owned firearms are protected, including commonly owned
long guns.8 So obviously blanket gun bans of the Washington
D.C. variety are prohibited. Also, the validation of selfdefense firearms seems to moot the sporting use filter that
seeped into the conversation about firearms legitimacy when
the Gun Control Act of 1968 used it to screen out certain
imported firearms. Armed self-defense, stigmatized under
the sporting use standard, is at the core of the right to arms
articulated in Heller.
One example of state legislation that should not survive
under the common use standard is New Jersey's Smart Gun
legislation. 9 This legislation will outlaw the retail sale of
ordinary handguns once user restricted "smart guns" are
commercially available.1
Ordinary handguns are widely
used, and explicitly protected under Heller."
Also vulnerable are regulations requiring loaded chamber

6. See infra Part III.
7. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
8. See id. at 2818 ("It is no answer to say ... that it is permissible to ban
the possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e., long
guns) is allowed.").
9. See S. 573, 210th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2002); A. 700, 210th Leg., Reg.
Sess., at 9-12 (N.J. 2002).
10. Jerry Gray, New Jersey Senate Passes Bill Requiring 'Smart Gun'
Devices, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1999, at B5.
11. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818.
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indicators, integral trigger locks, or magazine safeties.
These measures flow from the effort to regulate guns under
consumer product safety standards. Most guns do not have
loaded chamber indicators or magazine disconnects. Guns
without these features are undeniably common self-defense
guns. Indeed, some have argued that these safety features
substantially diminish the utility of the gun for self-defense. 13
Where this is true, the regulation would also defy Heller's
conclusion that armed self-defense is at the core of the right
to arms.14
In a slightly different analytical category, blanket
ammunition bans seem pretty clearly prohibited as an
implication of Heller. Even though Heller did not explicitly
address ammunition, it would eviscerate the right to say that
guns are protected but ammunition is not. However, certain
types of ammunition bans seem easily sustained under the
common use standard. Dramatic innovations like distancemeasuring exploding projectiles are a good example. 5 This
sort of dramatic innovation seems easily captured by the
common use standard.
These examples show that the
common use standard works well to resolve a range of
questions with a high level of predictability.

II. THE COMMON USE STANDARD AND THE INVITATION TO
MANIPULATION

A variety of problems are not so easily resolved under the
common use standard. These problems arise where the
common use standard seems to fit the dispute but predictions
about outcomes are complicated because the taxonomy is
12. See sources cited supra note 9.
13. Cynthia Leonardatos, Paul H. Blackman & David B. Kopel, Smart
Guns /Foolish Legislators:Findingthe Right Public Safety Laws, and Avoiding
the Wrong Ones, 34 CONN. L. REV. 157, 170-72 (2001).

14. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821 ("And whatever else it leaves to future
evaluation, [the Second Amendment] elevates above all other interests the right
of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and
home.").
15. XM25 Counter Defilade Target Engagement System: a Bullet They Can't
Dodge, POPULAR SCI., Dec 2009, at 51, availableat httpJ/www.popsci.com/bown/
2009/product/xm25-counter-defilade-target-engagement-system. See also ATK:
A Premier Aerospace and Defense Company, httpJ/www.atk.com (last visited
Apr. 10, 2010). The website provides information about distance-measuring
air-bursting projectiles. ATK, Air Bursting Munition, httpJ/www.atk.com/
capabilities defense/cs as ma abm.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
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I will
distorted by politics, mythology and symbolism.
illustrate this in context of laws banning assault weapons and
hollow point ammunition.
I use the term "distorted taxonomy" to capture the idea
that the enterprise of creating categories follows some basic
rules and that gun regulation is afflicted by politics and
mythology that tempt manipulation of those rules. At the
most basic level, a subcategory will display the same
properties as its super type, as well as some differences. In
undistorted cases it is easy to have a principled discussion
about what constitutes a substantive distinction and a
But in the gun debate, some
legitimate subcategory.
distinctions are mainly political or symbolic. This distorts the
delineation of legitimate substantive categories and
complicates extrapolations from the common use standard.
State laws banning "assault weapons" illustrate the
problem. Within the category "firearm" we can legitimately
create the subcategory "rifle" and from there, the subcategory
"semiautomatic rifle." These all reflect easily defensible
substantive distinctions. The federal government and some
states have attempted to define and outlaw a subcategory of
semiautomatic rifles called "assault weapons."' 6 The Federal
Assault Weapons Ban (AWB) has expired, but several state
bans remain in place and those raise interesting questions
that transfer to other problems. 17
I have argued elsewhere that semiautomatic rifles as a
category are difficult to reduce further, that legislative
legitimate
and
illegitimate
distinctions
between
semiautomatic rifles are incoherent, and that compared to
are
other
multi-shot
technologies,
semiautomatics
8
unexceptional.1 Nonetheless, the assault weapons category
16. Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act (Assault
Weapons Ban), Pub. L. No. 104-322, 108 Stat. 1996 (1994) (expired in 2004).
See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions: Assault Weapons Registration,
http://ag.ca.gov/firearms/regagunfaqs.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (describing
California Assault Weapons regulations); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 12276
(West 2006).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 42-44 (discussing hollow point
ammunition regulations).
18. Nicholas J. Johnson, Supply Restrictions at the Margins of Heller and
the Abortion Analogue: Stenberg Principles, Assault Weapons, and the
Attitudinalist Critique, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1285 (2009) [hereinafter Johnson,
Supply Restrictions]; Nicholas J. Johnson, Shots Across No Man's Land: A
Response to Handgun Control, Inc.'s, RichardAborn, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 441
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has undeniable political and symbolic resonance. Indeed, the
category is so wrapped in mythology 19 that states,
municipalities, and perhaps even courts will feel especially
pressured to uphold those distinctions.2 ° It is fair then to
predict that challenges to state assault weapons bans will not
proceed under pristine exercises of logic or empirical analysis.
Instead, these cases will likely invite aggressive, creative
manipulation of the common use standard and basic
principles of taxonomy toward the goal of upholding assault
weapons restrictions.
There is precedent for this.
Similar manipulation
occurred on the heels of United States v. Miller,2 where very
quickly in Cases v. United States and United States v. Tot,
lower courts embellished what the Supreme Court actually
said with additional, more restrictive layers and rhetoric that
was used by subsequent courts to support restrictive
interpretations of Miller.2 2
This resulted in the near(1995).
19. For many years I have conducted a survey of the students in my gun
control seminar. One of the questions asks the students to define assault
weapons. These definitions reflect the various, wildly inaccurate impressions
about the capabilities of this amorphous classification. I have argued elsewhere
that these guns are unexceptional in every functional category. See Johnson,
Supply Restrictions, supra note 18, at 1289-1302.
20. From the perspective of neutral legal analysis, such pressure should be
irrelevant. However, the view among many political scientists who advance the
Attitudinalist critique is that extrapolation from neutral principles does not
predict judicial decisions as effectively as do estimates based on political
influences. See generally Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court
Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting
Supreme CourtDecisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004).
21. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
22. See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942) ("[Ilf the
rule of the Miller case is general and complete, the result would follow that,
under present day conditions, the federal government would be empowered only
to regulate the possession or use of weapons such as a flintlock musket or a
matchlock harquebus."); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942)
("The Court said that in the absence of evidence tending to show that possession
of such a gun at the time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation
or efficiency of a well regulated militia, it could not be said that the Second
Amendment guarantees the right to keep such an instrument."); see also
Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment as an "Underenforced
Constitutional Norm", 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 719, 733-34 (1998)
[hereinafter Denning, Gun Shy]; Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be
Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretationsof United States v. Miller and the Second
Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961, 962-63 (1996) [hereinafter Denning, Simple
Cite]; Nicholas J. Johnson, Testing the States' Rights Second Amendment for
Content: A Showdown Between FederalEnvironmental Closure of FiringRanges
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unanimous view of lower federal courts that Miller had
unambiguously rejected the individual rights view of the
Second Amendment.2 3
Brannon Denning has detailed how many of the lower
federal court cases that claimed Miller only protected a
collective right were actually grounded on the embellishments
added by Cases and Tot.24 It is fair to worry that something
similar will follow Heller and McDonald-that lower courts
will be tempted to diminish those cases and the Supreme
Court will respond or not depending on its political makeup
at the time.
So how precisely might this unfold? One fairly obvious
response to an assault weapons ban challenge is the local
community
standards
argument
where
the
state
acknowledges that Heller protects guns in common use but
contends that "these guns are not common here in New
Jersey." A long standing ban might allow the state to make a
plausible empirical case on this point.25
To buttress the argument, the state might advance an
analogy to the pornography filter under the First
Amendment. In that context, the Court has employed a local
community standards test for determining whether materials
constitute pornography and thus fall outside the scope of
First Amendment protection. 26
If courts play fair, the decisive rebuttal to this argument
is that it is no different from the District of Columbia's failed
claim in Heller. There, legal handguns were uncommon in
the District but common outside it. 27 The idea that the
District could configure its own local version of the right to

and Protective State Legislation, 38 IND. L. REv. 689, 690-91 (2005) [hereinafter
Johnson, Testing].
23. See Cases, 131 F.2d at 922; Tot, 131 F.2d at 266; see also Denning, Gun
Shy, supra note 22, at 733-34; Denning, Simple Cite, supra note 22, at 962-63;
Johnson, Testing, supra note 22, at 690-91.
24. See Cases, 131 F.2d at 922; Tot, 131 F.2d 266; see also Denning, Gun
Shy, supra note 22, at 733-34; Denning, Simple Cite, supra note 22, at 962-63;
Johnson, Testing, supra note 22, at 690-91.
25. The empirical demands may indeed limit this argument to states that
have longstanding regulatory filters excluding particular weapons.
See
Nicholas J. Johnson, The Second Amendment in the States and the Limits of the
Common Use Standard, 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY (forthcoming 2010).
26. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973).
27. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128. S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
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keep and bear arms was decisively rejected.2" The local
community standards argument renders precisely the
outcome urged in Justice Breyer's dissent.2 9 Breyer would
have given communities the discretion to decide that their
situation was special and therefore to constrict the
constitutional right to some fraction of what is enjoyed by the
rest of the country.30 Any court that exhibits even a modicum
flatly reject the
of respect for the Heller precedent should
local community standards argument. 31
Losing the local community standards argument would
push states and municipalities to play a new taxonomical
If forced to respect the national inventory as a
game.
measure of guns in common use, states will find it very hard
to sustain their current assault weapons bans. The reason is
that it is very difficult under any circumstances to maintain
bans on rifles that use the AR-15 platform. 32 The AR-15 is
the semi-automatic version of the U.S. Army infantry rifle
and the quintessential "assault rifle." 33 The ubiquity of the
AR-15 blocks any honest argument that semiautomatic rifles
with pistol grips or other "AW features" are uncommon.
For most of the last decade, the AR-15 was the best
28. Id. at 2821-22.
29. Id. at 2847-48 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The law is tailored to the urban
crime problem in that it is local in scope and thus affects only a geographic area
both limited in size and entirely urban; the law concerns handguns, which are
specially linked to urban gun deaths and injuries, and which are
overwhelmingly the favorite weapon of armed criminals; and at the same time,
the law imposes a burden upon gun owners that seems proportionately no
greater than restrictions in existence at the time the Second Amendment was
adopted."); id. at 2855 ("The District did not seek to prohibit possession of other
sorts of weapons deemed more suitable for an 'urban area.'"); id. at 2860-61
("In fact, deference to legislative judgment seems particularly appropriate here,
where the judgment has been made by a local legislature, with particular
knowledge of local problems and insight into appropriate local solutions.
Different localities may seek to solve similar problems in different ways, and a
,city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to
admittedly serious problems.'" (citations omitted)).
30. Id. at 2860-61.
31. The City of Chicago made a similar argument in McDonald that
generated an informative exchange with the Court. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 52-55, McDonald v. Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 1317 (2009) (No. 08-1521).
32. See Johnson, Supply Restrictions,supra note 18, at 1321.
33. Id. at 1303. These rifles have all of the features-pistol grips, bayonet
lugs, collapsing stocks, and detachable box magazines-used to define the
category of "assault weapons." For an image see, San Francisco Murder
Prevention: Buy Back the AR-15s and Uzis, httpJ/blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/
2007/07/san.francisco murder-preventio.php (July 31 2007, 18:01 PST).
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selling rifle type in the country.34 Scores of companies, many
of which did not exist ten years ago, 35 now make guns in this
configuration. Nearly all of the major manufacturers now
make AR platform guns.3" The platform is widely employed
in hunting rifles, and it is the favored platform for Civilian
Marksmanship Program (CMP) competitions.3 7 Within gun
culture the AR-15 is known as "America's rifle." 38 It is a
tremendously versatile gun whose component construction
allows it to be customized for a wide range of sporting and
self-defense uses. 9
Lumping AR-15 style guns together with other guns on
the typical ban list produces a very large category of "common
firearms" protected under Heller. Consequently, states or
municipalities that want to preserve their assault weapons
bans will have to draw the category more finely so as to carve
off the AR-15. By whittling down the category, states may be
able to salvage their assault weapons legislation. But rather
34. Id. at 1296. See also The Congressional Sportsmen's Foundation, NSSF
Campaign to Educate America on AR-15 Rifles, http://www.sportsmenslink.org/
mediaroon/in the-news/NSSF-Campaign-to-Educate-America-On-AR-15-Rifles
(last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
"The best-selling rifles in America today are those based on the AR-15
platform-they are today's modem sporting rifles-yet they remain
America's most misunderstood firearm because of confusion caused by
their cosmetic features," said Steve Sanetti, president of the National
Shooting Sports Foundation, trade association for the firearms
industry.
Id.
35. See AR15.com, Industry, http://www.ar15.com/forums/board.html?b=2
(last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
36. Johnson, Supply Restrictions, supra note 18, at 1296.
37. See Civilian Marksmanship Program, http://www.odcmp.com (last
visited Apr. 26, 2010). Civilian Marksmanship Program was previously a part of
the Department of the Army. It was reconstituted in 1996 under Title 36 U. S.
Code, §40701-40733 which created the Corporation for the Promotion of Rifle
Practice and Firearms Safety, Inc. (CPRPFS, the formal legal name of the CMP)
for the purposes of instructing citizens in marksmanship; promoting practice
and firearms safety through competitions, support of gun clubs and sales of
firearms (including semiautomatic battle rifles) to private citizens. For decades
it was directly funded and supported by the United States Government. See
also Johnson, Testing, supra note 22, at 717-18.
38. Johnson, Supply Restrictions,supra note 18, at 1296 n.84.
39. The ubiquity of the AR-15 is one of the unintended consequences of the
Federal Assault Weapons Ban. The Ban stimulated demand for these guns
generally and the AR-15 especially. See Johnson, Supply Restrictions, supra
note 18, at 1305-09; Nicholas J. Johnson, A Second Amendment Moment: The
Constitutional Politics of Gun Control, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 715, 781-784 (2005)
[hereinafter Johnson, Second Amendment Moment].
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than attempting to ban all guns with pistol grips and other
"assault weapons" features, they will be forced to draw more
obscure
fewer, more
capturing
categories
detailed
semiautomatic guns. This will maintain the political and
symbolic benefits that have always been the primary value of
such laws.4 °
Certain types of ammunition restrictions invite a similar
New Jersey, for example, bans hollow point
exercise.
handgun ammunition.4 1 Hollow point bullets are designed to
expand in the target and are undeniably common. Still,
mythology and political symbolism surround the issue, such
that there will be tremendous resistance to overturning the
New Jersey ban. It is fair to expect the same two-stage
response to a constitutional challenge. First, the state will
make unsustainable arguments that hollow points are not
common "here"; second, it will attempt to show distinctions
within the category that permit continuation of the ban in
some reduced form.
The second stage response-i.e., carving out obscure new
subcategories in order to sustain the ban-is more difficult
here. Unlike the assault weapons category, hollow point
ammunition is less susceptible to further distinctions based
on appearance. So the technique that might save an AWBi.e., carving off some large sub-category while maintaining
the ban against the obscure remainder-is harder to sustain
in the ammunition context. It is just harder to support
distinctions between common hollow point ammunition and
exotics, ammunition at the edges of the category.
Also, for any particular caliber (which roughly means
bullet diameter measured in hundredths of an inch) the
argument that any expanding bullet is exotic is thwarted by
comparison to larger calibers.4 2 A hollow point projectile in
any given caliber will expand to approximate the size and
destructive capacity of a non-hollow point in a higher caliber.
Assume that the maximum expansion of a .25 caliber hollow
point is less than .40 caliber. Assume also that the state
allows non-hollow point ammunition exceeding .40 caliber.
Here, the banned hollow point ammunition will be less

40. Johnson, Supply Restrictions, supra note 18, at 1290-91.
41. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-3(f) (West 2010).
42. Expansion of the projectile is achieved through hollow point design.

1272

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:50

destructive than the permitted non-hollow point. On this
evidence, the ban should not survive even rational basis
scrutiny.4 3
It may well turn out that only bans on true technological
innovations,
like
the
distance-measuring
exploding
projectiles, can be sustained. But that sort of innovation
recall is already easily captured by the common use test.'
This suggests that ammunition restrictions are less
susceptible than assault weapons bans to taxonomical
manipulation.
Still, the broader point is that Heller invites this kind of
manipulation. The open question is how far courts will credit
the fine distinctions that are necessary to maintain
restrictions on particular categories of technology. How small
a difference in appearance, mechanics, or ballistics will
sustain a separate regulated category? Spinning the analysis
hard enough eventually makes every gun or brand of
ammunition a category onto itself resulting in fewer
categories large enough to satisfy the common use standard.
Some will object that these distinctions are irrational and
45
elevate form over function. I acknowledge that objection.
But my operating assumption has been that the taxonomy
here is prone to this type of distortion.
How much work will the Supreme Court do to build on
the common use standard so as to thwart this kind of
manipulation?
That depends on how the Court evolves
politically. If the Court neglects the standard, it is easy to
anticipate ongoing manipulation of regulated categories,
weakening of the common use standard, and consequent
weakening of the right to keep and bear arms.

43. For example, if the maximum allowable diameter is .45 caliber (45/100
of an inch), hollow point ammunition designed to expand beyond that diameter
might rationally be banned. But even then, banning .25 caliber hollow points
would be questionable because .25 caliber hollow points will not expand to .45
caliber and do not approach .45 ball (i.e., non hollow point) ammunition in
destructiveness. Also, setting a maximum diameter still does not address the
primary question: is the ammunition type generally "common"?
44. Still, that may be enough to permit the state to reap continued political
benefit by fashioning a criminologically irrelevant-but constitutionally
defensible-regulation that scores political points.
45. Johnson, Supply Restrictions, supra note 18, at 1321.
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III. BEYOND COMMON USE: REGULATORY BURDEN, TAKINGS,
AND REASONABLENESS

A third category of regulations exist entirely outside the
reach of the common use standard. These regulations do
not ban guns. They simply add friction to keeping and
bearing firearms. The common use standard, even with
embellishments, does not capture these regulations.
Anticipating challenges to these regulations prompts
thinking about the places where the Court has employed
levels of scrutiny or interest balancing to resolve conflicts
between the government and the right bearer.46 However,
reservations expressed by Chief Justice Roberts at oral
argument in Heller suggest that the Court might resist
layering its Second Amendment analysis with such extraconstitutional constructs.4 7 If so, decision making in this
third category might proceed by analogy to the Court's
This is an apt and
regulatory takings jurisprudence.
predictable methodology because the test is whether the
regulation essentially consumes the right. 49 The suggestion
46. Andrew R. Gould, The Hidden Second Amendment Framework Within
District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1548-50 (2009). Justice
Breyer's dissent in Heller criticizes the majority for failing to adopt such a
standard. Breyer contends that the proper level of scrutiny under the Second
Amendment is the interest-balancing approach that he advocates. Dist. of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2852 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
47. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 7290).
Well, these various phrases under the different standards that are
proposed, 'compelling interest,' 'significant interest,' 'narrowly tailored,'
none of them appear in the Constitution; and I wonder why in this case
we have to articulate an all-encompassing standard. Isn't it enough to
determine the scope of the existing right that the amendment refers to,
look at the various regulations that were available at the time,
including you can't take the gun to the marketplace and all that, and
determine how these... how this restriction and the scope of this right
looks in relation to those? I'm not sure why we have to articulate some
very intricate standard. I mean, these standards that apply in the
First Amendment just kind of developed over the years as sort of
baggage that the First Amendment picked up. But I don't know why
when we are starting afresh, we would try to articulate a whole
standard that would apply in every case?
Id.
48. See id.
49. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) ("[Wlhen
the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good,... he has suffered a taking.");
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in Heller that many of the gun regulations now in place do
not violate the Second Amendment 5° signals that the Court
will tolerate significant regulatory friction in the process of
acquiring guns, so long as the core right is ultimately
respected. The regulatory taking threshold seems like a fair
model for predicting how these challenges will turn out.
Imagine a law that says you can buy a new gun, but only
after you jump through what turns out to be an infinite series
of hoops and that, practically speaking, means you can never
own a gun. Such regulation consumes the right to own a gun,
so it is easy to imagine a court striking it down. On the other
hand, a variety of regulatory measures that introduce minor
taxes, processing fees, or short delays in acquiring firearms
51
seem well within constitutional norms under this analogy.
Several of the administrative rules that the Heller Court
suggested were presumptively a valid fit here. 52 Still within
this category, some existing regulations are suspect and some
pose very difficult problems.5 3 The most interesting and
toughest of these are regulations governing possession of
firearms outside the home.
The language of the Second Amendment guarantees a
right to keep and bear arms. The question is whether states
can entirely ban citizens from bearing arms outside the home
for self-defense. Have states violated the Second Amendment
if they fail to establish some sort of system for permitting
trustworthy people to carry defensive firearms in public?
There are at least two versions of the question.
The first is easier to answer. Over the last twenty years,
the vast majority of states have enacted non-discretionary
The open issue is how an
concealed carry laws.5 4
incorporated Second Amendment will affect questions of
reciprocity or issuance of carry permits to out-of-state
applicants. It is fair to predict that this will be resolved in a
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("[11f regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking.").
50. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2844-45 & n.38 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. "Safe" or "smart" gun mandates, and one-gun-a-month laws pose tough
questions for a court intent on balancing competing interests. See Nicholas J.
Johnson, Imagining Gun Control in America: Understanding the Remainder
Problem, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 837, 880-885 (2008).
54. Johnson, Second Amendment Moment, supra note 39, at 865.
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way that treats residents and nonresidents equally in terms
of access to carry permits. The arguments for and against
such treatment would be grounded on the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection clause, or even the commerce
claims about discrimination against out of
clause (tracking
55
actors).
state
The second and harder question arises in the relatively
few places where citizens cannot obtain carry permits under
any circumstances. Even though it is easy to say that states
that refuse to design a scheme for licensed carry have
violated the right to bear arms, it is a fair bet that courts in
those jurisdictions will try very hard to limit Heller's holding
to its facts-i.e., protection of the right to keep a firearm for
self-defense in the home. As far as the Supreme Court's
ultimate treatment of the question, consider that one of the
glib critiques of Heller (and Supreme Court decisions
generally) is that the Court seeks to reflect, and will not stray
far from, the American consensus. Under that critique,
Heller then just reflects the majority view in America about
the right to arms-a large number of people have guns and
most people believe you have a right to have a gun in the
home for self-defense.
If this is the measure, it complicates the question of a
right to arms outside the home. While it is true that
nondiscretionary concealed carry is the norm in the vast
majority of states, there is a lack of uniformity in the
details. 56 There is also tremendous variation between states
on questions like open carry, hunting use, transportation to
and from shooting ranges, vehicle carry, and mitigation of
penalties for legitimate self-defense with an illegally carried
gun. These examples illustrate substantial variations in
customs and perceptions about bearing arms outside the
home.
Treatment of the "right to bear arms" question is likely to
run one of two ways. If faced with the question under the
current circumstances, the Court will likely duck it and pass
it to state legislatures. That will not be a satisfactory
55. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)
("We have interpreted the Commerce Clause to invalidate local laws that
impose commercial barriers or discriminate against an article of commerce by
reason of its origin or destination out of State.").
56. Johnson, Second Amendment Moment, supra note 39, at 725-44.
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constitutional response, but it will be a tempting political
response. However, if there is more work done on this front
in terms of national reciprocity and if the empirical results
continue to show concealed carry to be either good or benign
policy, then it might develop into a norm that some members
of the Supreme Court would be willing to enforce.
CONCLUSION

This article is predictive, not normative. It credits the
political impulses that afflict gun rights jurisprudence. There
is no doubt that in some circles, gun bans and talk of rolling
back Heller are very popular and good politics. Justice
Ginsberg recently commented on the importance of dissenting
opinions and how dissents can evolve into the majority view
of a "future, wiser court. ' 57 She noted that the dissents in
Heller are good and proper examples of where this might
occur. She probably is not alone in this view.
So even though the individual right to arms is likely to be
extended to the states in McDonald, one cannot simply reason
forward to firm predictions about the boundaries of the
Second Amendment. Lower courts are likely to play very
rough with McDonald and Heller. They cannot be counted on
to nurture the Second Amendment with the same care and
rights-affirming bias generally applied to more favored
constitutional rights.

57. Posting of David Kopel to The Volokh Conspiracy, http'/volokh.com/
2009/12/20/justice-ginsburg-supreme-court-may-eventually-overrule-heller (Dec.
20, 2009, 12:58 EST).

